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INTRODUCTION
In act three, scene two of The Tempest, Stephano, a
drunken steward, has just crowned himself mock-king of the
island on which he and his master are stranded. He hears
music, but he cannot tell where the music is coming from.
“This will prove a brave kingdom to me,” he says, “where I shall
have my music for nothing.”1
Like Stephano, millions of Internet users stand amazed at
the variety of music available to them “for nothing.”
Technology has made instant distribution of music to home
computers widely available. Most people do not pay for their
downloads. The peer-to-peer file sharing world teeters on the
edge of legitimacy. Users are unsure of whether to start paying
for music or keep downloading with hope the music will keep
playing.
The instability of the current peer-to-peer file sharing
situation, is captured by the story of Brianna LaHara.2 After
using KaZaA to share her favorite songs, Brianna was sued for
copyright infringement, and she settled for $2,000.3 Brianna is
twelve years old.4 What combination of fear, desperation, and
hubris could drive the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) to sue a child on behalf of its member record
companies?
The answer is the popularity of peer-to-peer file sharing.
Among young music fans, peer-to-peer file sharing (“P2P”) is an
exceedingly popular way to consume music. For some, P2P is
the only way to access music.5 P2P certainly owes much of its
1. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 3, sc. 2 (George Lyman
Kittredge, ed., Anthenæum Press 1939).
2. Adam Liptak, The Music Industry Reveals Its Carrots and Sticks, N.Y.
TIMES, September 14, 2003, § 4, at 5.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See http://whatacrappypresent.com (last visited October 17, 2004)
(humorously warning parents against giving CDs as gifts because kids
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popularity to its price. It is free, but other factors also
contribute to its widespread use. The selection is unbeatable;
any music ever released on compact disc (CD) is likely to be
available on a P2P network. The most popular songs are
widely available and, because of their popularity, download in a
flash. Because each song is downloaded at zero marginal cost to
the consumer, music fans can try music they would otherwise
not purchase; if they don’t like it, they can simply delete it.
The problem is that much of this P2P downloading is illegal.
Since neither artists nor record companies profit from P2P
downloads, as downloading becomes a popular alternative to
purchasing CDs the viability of the music industry’s current
structure is threatened.
Licensing under the current regime makes legitimate peerto-peer distribution of commercial recordings very difficult.
Several scholars have proposed alternative compensation
systems. This article presents an alternative compensation
system that, unlike the proposals of Neil Weinstock Netanel,
William W. Fisher III and Jessica Litman, is technically
feasible, economically sound, and does not require
modifications to international agreements to which the United
States is a party.
I. THE CURRENT REGIME
Any musical recording involves two separate copyrighted
works: the musical work and the sound recording. The audio
heard on a CD is covered by a “sound recording” copyright.6
The underlying musical composition, which includes elements
such as melody, lyrics, and harmony that could be written
down on sheet music is protected by a separate “musical work”
copyright.7 Because musical recordings are copyrighted, a
license is required for anyone other than the copyright holder
to copy and disseminate this type of recording. The following
sections outline the steps needed to license a number of common
methods of dissemination, taking as an example the song “Baby One
More Time” on Britney Spears’ debut album.

routinely download music).
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2000) (listing sound recordings among
categories of copyrightable works).
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2000) (listing musical works among
categories of copyrightable works).
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A. LICENSING FOR CD REPRODUCTION
Imagine I wish to use my computer to burn a few dozen
CDs containing Britney Spears’ recording of “Baby One More
Time” to give to friends and acquaintances. My computer is not
a “digital audio recording device” as defined in 17 U.S.C. §
1001,8 so the noncommercial use exemption of 17 U.S.C. § 1008
does not apply.9 In addition, the Recordable CDs (CD-Rs) I am
using are primarily intended to hold non-musical data, so no
royalty is included in the purchase price of the CD-Rs. Burning
copies of this song on these discs constitutes copyright
infringement.10 Thus, I must get a license to use both the sound
recording and the underlying musical work to lawfully make
and distribute these CDs to my friends and acquaintances.
Permission to produce and distribute phonorecords11 of the
musical work is known as a “mechanical license.”12 Mechanical
licenses are subject to the compulsory license scheme set forth
in section 115 of the Copyright Act.13 Licenses for the
production of phonorecords must be issued at a rate set by
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (2000) (defining digital audio recording device
as any machine or device with a digital recording function “designed or
marketed for the primary purpose of . . . making a digital audio copied
recording for private use”).
9. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000) (prohibiting copyright infringement
actions based on noncommercial use of digital audio recording devices, but
including no prohibition for use of a computer).
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(4)(B)(ii) (2000) (excluding media marketed and
commonly used “for the purpose of making copies of nonmusical literary
works” from the definition of “digital audio recording medium”); 17 U.S.C. §
1003(a) (2000) (mandating royalty payments by manufacturers of digital audio
recording media); 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000) (prohibiting copyright infringement
actions based on noncommercial copies made onto digital audio recording
media, but failing to similarly prohibit copyright infringement actions
involving noncommercial copies made onto media not classified as digital
audio recording media).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (phonorecord is defined as “any material object
in which sounds . . . are fixed by any method now known or later developed,
and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”). From
this definition LPs, CDs, cassette tapes, and computer disks containing sound
recordings are phonorecords. Cf. AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, THE ART OF MUSIC
LICENSING 56, 307 (Prentice Hall Law & Business, 1992).
12. AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, supra note 11, at 45, 310.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (“In the case of nondramatic musical works,
the exclusive rights provided by clauses (1) and (3) of section 106, to make and
to distribute phonorecords of such works, are subject to compulsory licensing
under the conditions specified by this section.”); AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, supra
note 11, at 310-311.
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statute.14 As of September 2004, the statutory rate was 8.5
cents per phonorecord or 1.65 cents per minute of playing time
or fraction thereof, whichever is greater.15
“Baby One More Time” was composed by Max Martin.16
Therefore, he was the original holder of the copyright
underlying the musical work recorded by Spears.17 Rather than
personally handle requests for compulsory mechanical licenses,
Martin assigned his copyright to Zomba Enterprises, a music
publishing company.18 As is common in the music industry,
Zomba Enterprises, in turn, authorized the Harry Fox Agency
(HFA) to issue licenses on its behalf.19 Due to this series of
copyright assignments, if I wish to lawfully distribute CDs
containing “Baby One More Time,” I must obtain permission to
do so and pay 8.5 cents per copy to the HFA. 20 The Harry Fox
Agency will distribute 93.25% of the license fee to Zomba
Enterprises, 21 and Zomba Enterprises will then likely disperse
a contractually-specified amount of that percentage to Max
Martin. This process allows me to produce and distribute
copies of the underlying musical work.
Before I begin burning CDs, I must also secure a license for
the sound recording of “Baby One More Time.” Since no
compulsory license system is in place for sound recordings, I
must enter into a “master use license” with the copyright owner
of the sound recording to lawfully copy the recording.22
Ordinarily, the record company that released the recording

14. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c) (2000); AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, supra note 11 at
311.
15. United States Copyright Office, 17 U.S.C. §115 Mechanical License
Royalty Rates (stating current mechanical license royalty rates), at
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/m200a.html (last visited October 17, 2004).
16. Copyright Registration No. PA-922-764 (registered Oct. 29, 1998).
17. Id.
18. See http://www.copyright.gov/records/cohd.html (last visited October
17, 2004) (showing Zomba Music Publishers as the copyright owners on a
search of assignment V3488 P611). In an assignment recorded at V3488 P611,
the copyright was assigned to Zomba Music Publishers.
19. http://www.harryfox.com/index.jsp (last visited October 17, 2004)
(“[The Harry Fox Agency] is the foremost mechanical licensing, collections,
and distribution agency for U.S. music publishers.”); AL KOHN & BOB KOHN,
supra note 11 at 320.
20. United States Copyright Office, supra note 15.
21. http://www.harryfox.com/public/hfaInfoCommission.jsp (last visited
October 18, 2004) (stating that the Harry Fox Agency retains a 6.75%
commission for its services).
22. AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, supra note 11 at 11.
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owns the copyright.23 To burn copies of Britney Spears’ “Baby
One More Time,” I would have to negotiate a master use license
with Zomba Recordings, the parent company of Jive Records,
the company that released Spears’ debut CD.24 No central
administrator of master use rights exists, so each licensee must
negotiate directly with the copyright owner.25 Once I have
obtained a mechanical license from the Harry Fox Agency to
lawfully use the musical work and a master use license from
Zomba Recordings to use the sound recording, I am able to
lawfully make and distribute CDs to my friends and
acquaintances.
B. PUBLIC PERFORMANCE
Now imagine that I have acquired a lawful copy of “Baby
One More Time.” Let us make the further (counterfactual)
assumption that I enjoy the song, and want to share it with my
nightclub’s patrons. Simply playing the CD without a license
would be a violation of 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), because I would be
publicly performing the underlying musical work.26 Note that
playing the CD in my club does not violate any exclusive right
in the sound recording. In general, there is no exclusive right
to public performance of a sound recording.27 Thus, in the case
of a public performance of the recording as opposed to CD
production, I only need to a license from the copyright holder of
the musical work.
My task is aided by Performing Rights Organizations
(PROs). The PROs act as agents for music publishers by
collecting performance royalties on their behalf.28 Three PROs
23. See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, supra note 11 at 10.
24. See Copyright Registration No. SR-314-996 (registered Feb. 26, 2001).
25. See 6-30 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 30.03 (2004).
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000) (granting copyright holders the exclusive
right “in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly”).
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000) (granting the exclusive right to perform
sound recordings “by means of a digital audio transmission”). Playing a CD in
a club is not a “transmission” because the audio signals are not “received
beyond the place from which they are sent.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
28. See Broadcast Music, Inc. (stating BMI collects license fess on behalf
of creators it represents), at http://www.bmi.com/about/backgrounder.asp (last
visited October 17, 2004); The American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (stating ASCAP protects members’ rights by licensing and
distributing royalties), at http://www.ascap.com/about (last visited October 18,
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operate within the United States: The American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast
Music, Incorporated (BMI), and the Society of European Stage
Authors and Composers (SESAC).29 These organizations grant
blanket licenses to establishments of public accommodation,
such as bars and nightclubs that play music for their patrons.30
The performance rights for “Baby One More Time” are
administered by ASCAP.31 To play this song from a CD in my
club, I may enter into a blanket license for the use of any
ASCAP-licensed music. If after negotiating with ASCAP, I
believe the PRO is offering an unreasonable license rate, I may
initiate a “rate court” proceeding.32 During this proceeding, a
judge fixes a reasonable rate for the license I seek to obtain.
Under a consent decree known as the Amended Final
Judgment of March 14, 1950, ASCAP may not deny licenses to
any establishment willing to pay a judicially-fixed license
rate.33 Once I have obtained a public performance license from
ASCAP in accordance with this procedure, I may legally play
Spears’ CD in my establishment ad nauseam (which shouldn’t
take very long).
C. WEBCASTING
Imagine, further, that merely playing “Baby One More
Time” in my nightclub does not satisfy my urge to share
Spears’ unique joie de vivre. I decide I must disseminate the
song via the Internet. To acquire performance rights to the
musical work, I must enter into a license with ASCAP as
described above. As for the sound recording, “Baby One More
Time,” the Copyright Act grants the owner of a sound recording
2004).
29. AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, supra note 11 at 625-27.
30. See American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, ASCAP
Licenses A-Z (listing a diverse range of available ASCAP license types, from
Nightclubs to “Jai-Alai Frontons” to “Halls of Fame, Wax Museums, and
similar”), at http://www.ascap.com/licensing/types.html (last visited October
17, 2004).
31. ASCAP ACE Search for “Baby One More Time” (returning licensing
data for “Baby One More Time” by Karl Sandberg Martin, the legal name of
songwriter Max Martin, including a performance by Britney Spears), at
http://www.ascap.com/ace/search.cfm?mode=search (last visited October 17,
2004).
32. See Simon H. Rifkind, Music Copyrights and Antitrust: A Turbulent
Courtship, 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 9-11 (1985) (describing the
antitrust consent decree creating the ASCAP “rate court” procedure).
33. See id. at 9.
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copyright the exclusive right “to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”34 In
addition to this provision, Congress amended the Copyright Act
in 1998 to include a compulsory license scheme for
webcasting.35 A webcast is a digital audio transmission.
Therefore, I must license the sound recording, in addition to
the underlying musical work, in order to lawfully webcast the
song.
The 1998 compulsory license scheme only applies to
noninteractive webcasts.36 The amendment was designed to
guarantee that listeners do not receive advance notice of the
specific music scheduled to be transmitted,37 thus preventing
webcasts from becoming substitutes for CD purchases. Rates
and terms for webcast licenses are set by statute.38 The rates
and terms appropriate to a specific situation depend on the
nature and scope of the webcasting activity.39 In response to
this regulatory scheme, the RIAA created SoundExchange, a
collective rights organization, to administer webcasting
licenses.40 Small noncommercial webcasters with revenues
below $50,000 can webcast unlimited sound recordings for
$2,000 a year.41
What if I want to make copies available on a P2P network?
Currently, no compulsory license statute for P2P applications
exits. The remainder of this article discusses recent proposals
for such a system.
II. COMPULSORY LICENSING PROPOSALS FOR P2P
34. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 114(2) (2000).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 114(2)(A)(i) (2000).
37. 17 U.S.C. 114(2)(C)(ii) (prohibiting the publication of playlists before
transmission).
38. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(1)(A) (2000) (creating licenses for five
categories of webcasters: nonsubscription services, preexisting subscription
services, new subscription services, preexisting satellite digital audio radio
services, and business establishment services).
39. See id (stating terms and rates shall distinguish among currently
available forms of digital audio transmissions).
40. Record Industry Association of America (“SoundExchange licenses,
collects and distributes public performance revenue for sound recording
copyright holders within such digital channels as cable, satellite and webcast
transmissions.”), at http://www.riaa.com/about/collective/default.asp (last
visited October 18, 2004).
41. See Notification of Agreement Under the Small Webcaster Settlement
Act of 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 78,510, 78,512 (Dec. 24, 2002) (listing minimum fee
amounts for small webcasters).
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APPLICATIONS
Several respected copyright scholars have proposed
systems of compulsory blanket licensing of copyrighted content
for Internet use. These proposals share core goals. Professor
Neil Weinstock Netanel proposes a “Noncommerical Use Levy”
on P2P-related products and services.42 Professor William W.
Fisher III proposes a similar, yet more radical, levy system that
would allow greater commercial use within the blanket
Professor Jessica Litman proposes
licensing scheme.43
modifications to the Netanel and Fisher proposals.44 Within
these proposals, a alternative methods of raising money,
measuring usage, and distributing money have been advanced.
Each method has significant problems that stem from the
system’s displacement of private ordering.
A. COMMON GOALS
The Netanel, Fisher, and Litman proposals share two goals
in reforming the copyright system: semiotic democracy and
increased efficiency.
1. Semiotic Democracy
Each scholar expresses a desire for a greater variance of
expression. Under the current regime, creators who build on
existing copyrighted works must get permission from the
copyright holder.45 Because the copyrighted works that form
the bulk of our received culture are in the hands of a small
number of large corporations, these professors argue that a
semiotic oligarchy exits.46 A small number of powerful players
control the creation of meaning in our culture through their
stranglehold on copyrighted content.47 This is essentially a
question of equality; the choice of a default term diminishes the
ability of all citizens to participate equally in cultural
development.
42. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow
Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2003).
43. WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND
THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 202-3 (2004).
44. Jessica D. Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J.
(forthcoming
2004),
available
at
http://www.law.wayne.edu/litman/papers/sharing&stealing.pdf.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000) (granting the exclusive right “to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work”).
46. See e.g., FISHER, supra note 43 at 201.
47. See e.g., Netanel, supra note 42 at 7-9.
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The postmodern movement has seen the rise of pastiche
and bricolage as popular artistic forms. In pastiche, the artist
layers preexisting works and styles to create a new work which
plays on the tensions between the combined elements of the
preexisting works.48 In bricolage, the artist uses a variety of
cultural tools immediately at hand to create works of art.49
Against this cultural backdrop, Fisher proposes a goal of
“semiotic democracy,” distributing the power to make cultural
meaning over a larger range of speakers, destroying the
oligarchic power of media companies.50 As Fisher defines it,
“[i]n an attractive society, all persons would be able to
participate in the process of making cultural meaning. Instead
of being merely passive consumers of images and artifacts
produced by others, they would help shape the world of ideas
and symbols in which they live.”51
In copyright terms, postmodern creation is the preparation
of a series of derivative works.52 For example, “mash-ups”
constitute a genre of popular music. In a mash-up, the vocal
track of a popular song is mixed with the instrumental tracks
of a different popular song.53 The resulting work infringes
several copyrights.54 However, due to the relative ease of
creating mash-ups and the wide availability of the tools needed
to create them, vast numbers of bootleg mash-ups appear on
48. Cf. FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF
LATE CAPITALISM 16-19 (Post-Contemporary Interventions, Stanley Fish &
Frederic Jameson series eds., 1991) (defining and analyzing the concept of
postmodern pastiche).
49. See CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 19 (Julian Pitt-Rivers
& Ernest Gellner eds., George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd. trans., 1966)
(defining and analyzing postmodern bricolage).
50. JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 236-37 (1987) (defining the term
“semiotic democracy” as “delegation of production of meanings and pleasures
to . . . viewers”).
51. William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 193 (Stephen R.
Munzer ed., 2001).
52. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”).
53. Pete Rojas, Bootleg Culture, Salon.com (tracing the development and
cultural
ramifications
of
mash-ups),
at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/08/01/bootlegs/ (Aug. 1, 2002).
54. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000) (granting copyright holders the exclusive
right “to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work”).
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Internet sites and file-sharing networks.55 The ease with
which new forms of derivative works are able to be created in
the digital age, could plunge copyright holders into a worldwide
game of “Whack-A-Mole.” Allowing these derivative works to
be produced and disseminated will further semiotic democracy,
because control of the meaning of the works is seized from
media companies and placed in the hands of media consumers.
2. Increased Efficiency
The current music distribution system is rife with
transaction costs and other unnecessary burdens on the
This is, in essence, an
consumer purchase of music.56
argument about utility; the choice of a default term affects the
efficiency of the music distribution system. The most obvious
of these – and the easiest to eliminate – is the manufacturing
and retailing of physical media. Compulsory licensing has no
advantage over other paradigms for digital distribution (such
as à la carte downloads) in this respect, however, since they,
too, eliminate the cost of manufacturing and distributing
physical media.
Compulsory licensing does, however, have an advantage
over other market mechanisms in that it is unusually seamless
and fast-responding. The money allocated for promotion of
music, which currently makes up the bulk of the cost of a CD,
could be more efficiently allocated if market signals came
directly from consumers rather than through intermediaries
like radio station-based research and CD sales figures. By
improving the information available, we decrease music
producers’ uncertainty, which leads to a more efficient
allocation of resources. For this to happen, funds must be
distributed in proportion to consumer demand for the music.
B. THE PROPOSALS
Three similar proposals for alternative compensation
systems have been advanced. First, Professor Fisher proposes
a system of compulsory licensing with funds collected through
levies and distributed to copyright holders based on popularity.
Second, Professor Netanel proposes a similar system which
differs in a number of minor respects. Finally, Professor
Litman adds opt-out provisions to the Fisher and Netanel
55. Rojas, supra note 53.
56. See FISHER, supra note 43.
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proposals and distributes funds to authors, not copyright
holders.
1. Fisher’s Proposal
Fisher proposes a system of compulsory licensing for both
commercial and noncommercial verbatim and derivative
reproduction of music and movies.57 Works would first be
registered with the Copyright Office. A levy would be placed on
products used to consume media.58 Usage would be measured
through reporting, sampling, and surveys. Funds would be
distributed in proportion to the popularity of the work.59
a. Registration
Under Fisher’s system, a copyright holder who wanted to
be paid when his work was used by others would submit the
work to the Copyright Office, which would issue a globally
unique identifier for the work.60 Only music and audiovisual
works would be eligible for compulsory licensing.61 Any failure
to register would cause the work to fall into the public
domain.62 Once the system was in place, we would eliminate
“most of the current prohibitions on the unauthorized
reproduction, distribution, adaptation, and performance of
audio and video recordings” over the Internet.63
Of course, disputes would arise over registrations. Fisher
proposes to leave in place current rules about joint ownership
of copyrights and the contractual relations between the owners

57. See FISHER, supra note 43, at 202-4.
58. See id. at 216-17.
59. See id. at 223-34.
60. See id. at 203.
61. See id. Fisher offers no justification for this limitation; one assumes
that he so limits his proposal because he thinks only music and movies will be
traded over P2P networks. Certainly, the choice makes sense because the
structure of the music and movie industries lends itself to blanket licensing
much better than, for instance, the book publishing or software industries,
because while the vast majority of CDs and DVDs are priced between $10 and
$30, common book prices range from $1 to $75. Software prices vary even
more wildly. Setting a single price for those industries does seem less
palatable than for music and movies.
62. See id. at 5. This is the first of Fisher’s many proposals that would
violate United States’ treaty obligations. He recognizes these violations, and
suggests that the treaties will need to be modified before his system can be
implemented.
63. FISHER, supra note 43, at 202.
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of various copyrights in a single work.64 Each registration
would be subject to a trademark-like “opposition” procedure.65
If the work in question included portions of other works, the
registrant would be required to estimate what percentage of
the work to be registered is taken from existing works and to
give the registration numbers of the works it excerpts.66
b. Collection
Fisher proposes a tax on the goods and services used to
gain access to music and film as one method designed to
generate the money needed to compensate copyright holders for
revenues lost due to legalized P2P sharing.67 This tax would
apply to equipment used to make digital copies, media used to
store copies, and Internet access service.68 Modest taxes on all
of these goods, while overinclusive,69 would generate enough
money to compensate creators.70
c. Measurement
In order to distribute funds fairly, a rough estimate of the
relative popularity of works will be needed. Parties who
stream songs to users would be required to report what works,
referenced by registration number, were played back at what
Some loose survey evidence would be used to
times.71
determine rates of CD burning and how often those burned

64. See id. at 204.
65. Id. at 205. The wisdom of this procedural proposal is dubious.
Trademark holders must expend significant resources “policing” their marks,
preventing third parties from appropriating them to keep from losing their
rights. Copyright holders have no such obligation. While equitable defenses to
an infringement action may eventually arise, in general copyright holders
retain their exclusive rights without any affirmative action. It would be
extremely costly and inefficient to force copyright holders to search all new
registrations to make sure none were fraudulent re-registrations of their
works.
66. See id. at 205-6.
67. See id. at 217.
68. See id.
69. There is no way to tell, for instance, which CD-Rs that are sold will be
used for the storage of copyrighted music and which will be used for the
storage of data or public domain works. Thus, all CD-Rs must be taxed, and
some uses of technology unrelated to music and movies will become more
costly.
70. See id. at 217-22 (estimating the revenue from such taxes based on
retail sales figures).
71. See id. at 224-25.
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CDs get played.72 File-sharing services would also be required
to report all downloads of files bearing a registration number to
the Copyright Office.73 The number of times those downloaded
files are actually played would be determined by a system of
randomly-sampled usage measurement similar to the current
system of television ratings.74
Fisher is rightly concerned that unscrupulous parties will
attempt to “game” the system, attempting to make the
aggregate data reflect something other than the true popularity
of the works. For example, imagine that I have written a very
bad song, which has received a registration number upon
submission to the copyright office. Nobody really wants to
listen to my song; if the system operated perfectly, I would get
no money from the compulsory licensing authority. But I want
money, so I game the system. I modify my file sharing software
so that in every download report, it claims I have downloaded
my song many thousands of times. I stream my song from one
computer of mine to the other all day and all night, reporting
each stream to the Copyright Office. Not satisfied with these
numbers, I write a computer virus that causes each infected
machine to report thousands of downloads of my song and to
stream my song continuously. Quickly, my song seems to be
very popular, and I get a healthy slice of the money allocated to
compensate creators.75
Of course, appropriate regulations can make it illegal to do
all of these things, and the system would do its best to filter out
obviously bogus data. But the example above reveals a thorny
72. See id. at 225.
73. See id. This solution probably outlaws open-source file sharing
programs (since the numbers they report could be modified by a user) and all
file sharing systems that do not use a central server. For example, on the
Gnutella network, there exists no single point through which all search
requests go and to which all downloads are reported. Mandating network
architecture in this way seems likely to stifle innovation.
74. See id. at 226-28. Fisher makes a convincing argument that people
might be willing to have their consumption watched as long as their privacy
was protected. But among some of the segments of the population that
currently make the most use of P2P networks, a significant percentage of the
downloaded files consist of pornography. Presumably, these particular P2P
consumers would be less willing to have their consumption monitored.
75. Eugene Volokh has noted that special interest groups like the NRA
might use similar, more distributed methods to “game” alternative
compensation systems in order to express audience preferences having
nothing to do with music. See Eugene Volokh, Download Tax, at
http://volokh.com/2003_09_07_volokh_archive.html#106314198323180349
(last visited October 18, 2004).
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contradiction.
The most accurate and efficient ways to
measure the popularity of digital content violate two of the
values that have led to the wide adoption, success, and stability
of the Internet. The easiest, most accurate way to measure
downloads and streams is to monitor all bits on a segment of
the network and record how often certain works are
downloaded or streamed. However, this violates the “end-toend principle,” or “e2e.” The end-to-end principle holds that the
Internet should be as simple as possible, functioning simply to
route data between points on the network. The network works
best if it does not inspect data or provide any functionality
itself, but simply moves packets around.76 Computer science
specialists have made convincing arguments that placing highlevel functions in the network decreases utility and increases
Including measurement
the cost of the network.77
infrastructure in the network, rather than at the ends, could
have severe consequences for innovation.
However, putting the measurement structure in the ends
of the network has its own problems. If the measurement
infrastructure is placed in the ends, then users must trust the
ends to return authentic usage data, as Fisher assumes we
do.78 Fisher proposes collecting sampling data from trusted
playback and download devices.79 Although it is easiest to get
good data from tamper-proof devices, it is difficult to make
tamper-proof devices that are also open-source.80 Open source
tools have been the foundation of the Internet, and outlawing
their use to play back and download digital music files would
seriously stifle innovation by limiting users to proprietary
solutions.
As shown infra in section III-A-4, measurement of P2P
usage of files need not violate e2e and can be implemented in
open source software.

76. For a simple and well-written introduction to the end-to-end
argument, see Doc Searls and David Weinberger, World of Ends, at
http://www.worldofends.com/ (Last modified April 28, 2003).
77. See, e.g., J.H. Saltzer, D.P. Reed, and D.D. Clark, in End-to-End
Arguments in System Design, 2:4 ACM TRANSACTIONS IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS
277 (1984).
78. FISHER, supra note 43, at 226-28.
79. See id.
80. Because the user can modify the program, the user can make the
program return arbitrary data to the measurement authority.
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d. Distribution
Fisher proposes that funds be distributed by the Copyright
Office in proportion to the number of times the works were
consumed with three caveats. First, longer recordings would
yield larger payments for creators.81 Fisher defends this choice
by noting that longer musical works and movies tend to cost
more to make, and that limited consumer attention spans will
counteract any incentive to pad the length of artistic works.82
Second, payments for derivative works would be assessed based
on the creator’s rough estimation to the Copyright Office
concerning how much material is original or from preexisting
works, and compensation would then be distributed
proportionally to respective holders of the copyright in the
derivative and original.83 This would allow the creators of the
preexisting works used in samples, expurgated films, and
mash-ups to be appropriately compensated.84
2. Netanel’s Proposal
Netanel’s proposal for peer-to-peer file sharing is
substantially similar to Fisher’s but contains slight
For example, rather than allowing both
variations.85
commercial and noncommercial use under compulsory license,
Netanel allows only noncommercial use.86 Also, whereas
Fisher’s proposal encompasses only music and movies,
Netanel’s encompasses all copyrighted content other than
computer software and unpublished works.87 Finally, Netanel
proposes licensing the preparation of noncommercial derivative
works that would retain the original’s identifying information
and would compensate only the original creator.88
3. Litman’s Proposal
In her article Sharing and Stealing, Professor Jessica
81. See FISHER, supra note 43, at 230.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 235-6.
84. Id.
85. Though the proposals are similar, Netanel’s richly-documented paper
provides a more thorough analysis of numerous issues that Fisher is unable to
cover in a single chapter in his book.
86. See Netanel, supra note 42, at 42.
87. See id. at 41.
88. See id. at 38-39. But see FISHER, supra note 43, at 234-6 (describing
how authors of material underlying multilayered derivative works would be
compensated under his scheme).
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Litman proposes a partially voluntary blanket licensing
system.89 In Litman’s system, all existing music would be
included in a levy, measurement, and compensation system
like those proposed by Netanel and Fisher, however Litman’s
system, would allow authors to opt out and would deliver
revenue to creators, not copyright holders.90
a. Opt-out
Litman’s proposal allows copyright holders to opt out of the
blanket license scheme by fulfilling two requirements. First,
they must publish their works only in a yet-to-be-specified
format that includes copyright management information.91
Any music released only in a new “*.drm format”92 may not be
reproduced without the copyright holder’s consent, but
copyright holders who opt out are ineligible to share in the
compensation pool.93 A copyright holder’s remedies against a
user who shares the *.drm file without permission would be the
same as those that exist now.94 Litman argues that because so
much music would be freely downloadable, consumers would
respect a copyright holder’s decision to opt out of the free
distribution system.95 Because of this increased respect for
proprietary rights, enforcement against infringers of *.drm files
would be easier and more politically palatable than
enforcement against infringers is now.96 Under Litman’s
scheme it would be difficult for works distributed publicly in a
non-*.drm format, which includes all works published before
the system is put into place, to be withdrawn from availability
to the public.97
89. See Litman, supra note 44.
90. See id. at 39-47.
91. Id. at 48. Litman uses the definition of “copyright management
information” in 17 U.S.C. § 1202, which includes title, author, copyright
owner, etc. The big problem with this aspect of the proposal is technical, not
legal. People own lots of devices, like CD players, that they want to keep
using. Any format would have to be backward-compatible with the CD, and no
backward-compatible system of encoding copyright management information
exists.
92. This is Litman’s proposed name for a new file format or set of file
formats incorporating digital rights management (“DRM”) technology. See
Litman, supra note 44, at 48.
93. See Litman, supra note 44, at 43-45.
94. See id. at 46.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 47.
97. See id. at 46.
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This opt-out provision functions as a penalty default rule.
A penalty default exists when the law sets a default rule that
neither party will want, forcing the two parties to reveal
information to each other and to decide on bargained terms.98
Since 1976, authors have been allowed to divide their various
exclusive rights among a number of transferees.99 So, for
instance, the right to publicly perform a musical work might be
owned by a different party than the right to reproduce that
work. Litman intends the opt-out provision to eliminate some
of the tangle of rights that has arisen since the elimination of
the indivisibility rule.100 Because the work will be subject to
the compulsory license scheme if it is released to the public in
any form other than *.drm, the owners of the various exclusive
rights will be forced to bargain with each other to reach
licensing terms for the distribution of the work.101 Each owner
of an exclusive right has an equal bargaining position, since
each has the power to push the entire tangle of rights into the
compulsory licensing scheme. Thus, Litman gives each holder
of an exclusive right a “poison pill.” Copyright holders are
unlikely to divide up their rights because bargaining among
parties who all hold poison pills is extremely costly. Parties
who have sold off pieces of the pie are likely to buy them back,
so that they are certain that no transferee will take the “poison
pill.” Litman’s proposal reintroduces a de facto indivisibility
rule through the introduction of a penalty default rule.
Thus, placing copyright holders between two socially
beneficial outcomes has a number of advantages. It lessens
some of the loss in economic autonomy that comes with
compulsory license schemes, since it gives copyright holders at
least some choice. It guarantees a socially useful outcome
(leaving a prospective licensee with either a compulsory license
or a single party with whom to bargain). Finally, by requiring
parties who opt out to register with the Copyright Office, the
ownership of the copyright is known publicly so that
prospective licensees know whom to approach.102
98. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (introducing
the concept of the penalty default).
99. See Litman, supra note 44, at 17-18.
100. Id. at 44.
101. See id. at 47.
102. This registration requirement raises some treaty concerns, since
registration is a formality banned by the Berne Convention. See Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 14, 1967,

2004]

REFORM IN THE “BRAVE KINGDOM”

419

b. Bypassing Copyright Holders
The second difference between Litman’s proposal and
Fisher’s and Netanel’s is her method of distributing the funds
collected in the compulsory license scheme. Litman proposes
paying monies directly to creators, regardless of who owns the
copyright.103 Because the urge to establish a system of
compensation for P2P file sharing arises because “our sense of
fairness impels us to compensate creators because they deserve
to be paid,” Litman argues that we should simply compensate
the creators.104 In defending this proposal, Litman asserts that
it improves on the present allocation of authority to collect
royalties,
which
“has
systematically
disadvantaged
stakeholders who are small, independent or poorly
organized.”105
The legislative decision to give this windfall to the creators
rather than any subsequent owners of copyrights is analogous,
under this reasoning, to that made when Congress extended
the duration of copyright in 1998 and in 1976. Congress
decided that the benefit of the added duration should be given
to creators, not to transferees. Accordingly, the copyright term
extensions included provisions for the termination of transfers.
With appropriate notice, at the end of the original, preextension copyright term, artists could take back their
rights.106 The practical effect of this provision is that the owner
of the copyright at the expiration of the original copyright term
ends up paying the artist some large portion of the value of the
additional years of copyright protection.107 This is fair because
art. 5 § 2, 828 U.N.T.S. 223 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (“The enjoyment
and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality….”). See
Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2004) (discussing the Berne Convention’s ban on formalities).
103. See Litman, supra note 44, at 41-42.
104. Id. Litman makes the right alienable, but separate from ownership of
the copyrights themselves (which are, in most cases, already owned by the
record company and music publisher). A new agreement, separate from any
assignment of copyright, would be needed to designate the record company
and music publisher as intermediary for P2P royalties. While this is a better
solution than making the royalty rights entirely inalienable, it still radically
changes the landscape under which the recording contract was negotiated,
potentially going against the intent of the parties.
105. Id. at 41.
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2000) (termination provision of the 1998
Copyright Term Extension Act); 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2000) (termination provision
of the 1976 Copyright Act).
107. In few cases are the artists themselves in a position to adequately
exploit the work commercially. The assignment of rights to the artist ex ante
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at the time the artist sold his rights, the price reflected the
expectation of a certain copyright term; the expiration date of
the copyright was known to both parties, and they bargained
based on that information. Because the artist didn’t own those
extra twenty years when he sold the copyright, he couldn’t sell
them. If the transferee wants them, he should have to buy
them.
However, the two situations are not analogous. Basic to
the regulatory calculus of Fisher’s and Netanel’s proposals is
the goal of replacing revenue displaced by peer-to-peer file
sharing.108 Free P2P downloads are substitute goods for
purchased CDs – not perfect substitutes, as the RIAA seems to
but substitutes nonetheless.
While recording
claim,109
contracts did not contemplate revenues from a system of
compulsory licensing of P2P downloads, they did contemplate
revenues from CD sales. The Fisher and Netanel proposals are
designed to replace lost CD revenues, not to give record
companies a windfall.
There is no economic or legal
justification for a bare wealth transfer from the record
companies to the artists.
There is, however, some justification. Litman feels that
artists have been given a raw deal. Her “proposal is motivated
in part by [her] conviction that composers and musicians have
The record
been ill-served by the current system.”110
companies unfairly exploited the economically weak musicians,
strong-arming them into signing contracts they didn’t
understand and paying them a pittance for songs that made
the record companies millions.111 Musicians “[complain] so
simply gives her bargaining power in negotiations and forces the parties to
reach an agreement. See Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273,
275-76 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (arguing that the assignment of rights by
an outside authority allows an efficient price to be set by the parties without
further intervention). Because neither the artists nor other third parties are
likely to be the highest users of the copyright due to sunk costs on the part of
the transferee, this provision is likely to result in a more favorable royalty
arrangement for the artist.
108. See FISHER, supra note 43, at 242 (“the proposed regime would help
[copyright holders] by replacing the revenues they lose to Internet activities
with money transmitted through the Copyright Office.”); Netanel, supra note
42, at 46 (stating that his proposal seeks to “replace that fraction of copyright
industry revenues supplanted by NUL-privileged file sharing”).
109. The RIAA claims that the industry loses $4.2 billion per year.
Recording Industry Association of America (last visited October 17, 2004), at
http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/default.asp.
110. Litman, supra note 44, at 43.
111. See Future of Music Coalition, Major Label Contract Clause Critique,
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bitterly of their treatment at the hands of the record
companies,” but put out records nonetheless; we should give
them a slice of the pie.112
Litman, then, wants to rewrite recording contracts ex post
because she does not think they were fair. Her proposal would
operate as a particularly broad unconscionability statute,
partially vitiating all extant transfers of copyright. Like all
wealth transfers, it is not really efficient or inefficient; rather,
it is morally defensible or indefensible. In this case, it is not
defensible. While many musicians have been given a raw deal,
taking away their freedom of contract is not the answer.
In some instances, this would clearly work injustice.
Assume, counterfactually, that I am a talented, hip indie
rocker. I write and record a song and sell the rights to a small
independent label run out of a friend’s basement apartment.
The indie label sells CDs and sends me some of the proceeds,
spending significant amounts to promote me in all sorts of
perfectly laudable, non-payola ways – sending review copies of
my CD to music writers, printing up posters, having suitably
ironic post-glamorous photos of me taken. Then, Litman’s
compulsory license system is implemented. Sales of my CD
plummet as fans download the music on P2P networks, with
the absolute certainty that what they are doing is both legal
and just. I get a bunch of money I would not otherwise have
received; my friend’s label goes under because CD sales slump.
I record my next CD and release it on P2P networks. But
nobody downloads it, because nobody knows it’s there. Music
writers do not review it. I scramble to put promotional
infrastructure in place myself, but I fail. I just write the music;
it is the label’s job to promote it. My work fails in the
marketplace for lack of promotion. Now, though I received a
windfall from the sharing of my first album, the infrastructure
through which my work is promoted and edited has been
(Oct. 3, 2001) (analyzing common clauses in major label recording contracts
and
their
inequitable
effects
on
musicians),
at
http://www.futureofmusic.org/contractcrit.cfm. See also Tim Quirk, Welcome
to the Wall of Shame (June 6, 2001) (describing mistreatment at the hands of a
major label), at http://www.futureofmusic.org/articles/shameintro.cfm (last
visited October 17, 2004).
112. See Litman, supra note 44, at 29 n.115 (“Whether musicians will make
music if the copyright regime is altered is an empirical question, but the fact
that so many musicians have complained so bitterly at their treatment at the
hands of record companies without withholding their music suggests that
musicians’ motivations are more complex than the simple copyright-incentive
model captures.”).
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destroyed. My friend and I are both out of a job, and we cannot
even go back to our old jobs as record store clerks.
While it may not end up being as dire as all that, there is
no good reason to hand a pile of money to artists and force
them to take responsibility for their own careers. It may not be
what they want. If they want to promote themselves, they
may; all they have to do is hold on to their copyrights. We
should allow musicians to make that choice.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION PROPOSAL
A. MECHANICS OF THE PROPOSAL
1. Goals
The compensation schemes proposed by Fisher and
Netanel focus on compensating copyright holders for lost
revenues due to CD sales. The systems are designed to
simulate a world without P2P copying. But we no longer live in
a world without widespread P2P copying, and it is simply not
possible to put that particular cat back in that particular bag.
If we are to give copyright holders the choice to opt out, they do
not opt out into a world of perfect control over their copyrighted
works.
They opt out instead into a world in which
uncompensated copying is socially accepted and routine in all
segments of society, in which lawsuits against hundreds of
consumers have failed to make an appreciable dent in file
sharing activity, and in which Digital Rights Management
technologies are cracked routinely. Our system does not need
to make the record companies whole; all it must do is provide
an environment more attractive than the one that exists today.
Given the dire straits in which the record industry has lately
found itself, this should not be too difficult. There is room for a
scheme that improves on the status quo without reaching the
status quo ante bellum.
2. Scope
The compulsory license will be limited to musical works.
Only noncommercial use will be privileged; however, the
commercial distribution of copies for noncommercial use will be
allowed. The services of these “download service providers”
will be heavily levied, and profits will be small because such
services will have to compete with legal downloads from peers;
the presence of a free alternative will tend to depress prices
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and provide incentives for value-added services, like
organization of music, information about artists, community
features, and other popular services.113 This will also allow
artists, record companies, and their affiliates to distribute the
music they produce directly to consumers, though, as described
below, only peer-to-peer shares will be measured for purposes
of compensation.
Noncommercial derivative works will be allowed. To the
extent that they are substantially similar to the original, they
will have the same or a similar audio fingerprint as the
original, and will be counted in the popularity of the original.114
To the extent that it is not substantially similar, the use of the
original will not be counted for purposes of compensation.115 If
a musician wishes to create a derivative for commercial use,
she will have to negotiate with the copyright holders, as she
would now. Commercial derivatives would be counted just like
originals, and private contracts between the creator of the
derivative and the copyright holder in the original would
govern what portion of the derivative author’s revenues from
the levy system would be passed on to the copyright holder in
the original.
3. Participation
As in Litman’s proposal, copyright holders may opt out of
the system. If they do, they will have the same rights they do
113. This means that services like iTunes Music Store and Rhapsody will
likely survive the transition to compulsory licensing. Both their costs and
their revenues are likely to decrease, however. They’ll no longer need to pay
the record companies and music publishers, but they will no longer be the only
legal way to download music.
114. An audio fingerprint is a unique identifier of the audio content of a
song. It does not change when the audio is converted from one file format to
another. Since the audio fingerprint is shorter than the audio file itself, there
necessarily exists more than one audio file that generates a given audio
fingerprint. However, the chances of such a collision are so small that it is
unlikely that one will occur in many hundreds of years. Rob Kaye, founder of
MusicBrainz, a community-based music metadata project that relies on audio
fingerprinting technology, has pointed out that the present state of audio
fingerprinting technology is unlikely to provide the reliability needed for the
proposed system. While this is true now, the political obstacles preventing the
implementation of an alternative compensation system seem likely to allow
time for technology to catch up.
115. This is more for the sake of simplicity than anything else. Fisher’s
proposal that the creator of a derivative work guess at the percentage of the
work made up of other preexisting works is unsatisfying; absent any empirical
way to measure such derivatives, limiting the scope to noncommercial use and
compensating only substantially similar derivatives seems the best choice.
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today.116 If copyright holders choose to opt in, they must
register and deposit a copy of the work with the Copyright
Office.117 This registration will be separate from all subsisting
copyrights, and the registration will not be valid until it is
approved by all owners of copyright in the underlying works,
such as musical works, scripts, and sampled works. All
underlying copyrights must be registered and deposited before
the compulsory license scheme registration will issue.118 Like
Litman’s penalty default rule, this requirement forces the
owners of the underlying copyrights to bargain, because no
compulsory license revenue accrues until a valid registration
issues.119 To encourage copyright holders to opt in instead of
expending resources on Digital Rights Management technology,
section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act will be
modified to minimally comply with the terms of Article 11 of
the 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright
Treaty.120
116. Alternately, we could say that copyright holders who opt out have
some lower level of copyright protection, still within treaty obligations,
assuming the arguable proposition that such a level of protection exists.
117. The “work” here means the sound recording or audiovisual work that
is the final product of the production process.
118. This has the added side benefit of creating a record of the ownership
of all underlying copyrights and causing copies to be deposited with the
Library of Congress, so that the public will know when the works fall into the
public domain, and will be able to access a copy of the works when they do. For
a discussion of the importance of such formalities to an efficient copyright
system, see generally Sprigman, supra note 102.
119. Unlike Litman’s penalty default rule, this solution does not violate
any treaty obligations and does not require the creation of a backwardcompatible, watermarked audio format that all parties must use.
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000) (“No person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under this title.”). Article 11 of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty requires
signatories to prohibit circumvention of technological measures “that restrict
acts, in respect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors
concerned or permitted by law.” WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36
I.L.M.
65
(1997),
available
at
http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/94dc.htm (last visited October 17,
2004). Section 1201 will be modified to allow the production, distribution, and
traffic in circumvention devices, and it will allow circumvention for any
purpose not currently prohibited by the Copyright Act, including fair use,
reproduction of public domain works, reverse engineering, and so on. Because
traffic in circumvention devices will be legal, digital rights management
schemes would not work very well and would be abandoned in favor of
registration for compulsory license royalties. Courts have begun to read the
current language of Section 1201 in this way, focusing on the limitations the
Copyright Act places on exclusive rights. See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc. v.
Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Lexmark Int’l, Inc.
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At first, this does not seem like much of a penalty default
rule. After all, if the parties refuse to bargain and/or fail to
register, they all retain exclusive, proprietary rights
enforceable against the world. But how enforceable are those
rights, really, against noncommercial home use? Home use is
difficult to detect and deter. Once a compulsory license scheme
is in place, P2P networks will become legitimate avenues for
the distribution of all sorts of content. No longer will copyright
holders be able to argue that the majority of content swapped
on P2P networks is infringing. There will be at least a
“substantial noninfringing use” for any software or device used
to store, copy, share, or play back audio or video.121 Lawsuits
against operators of second-generation P2P networks have
failed so far, and they are likely to continue to fail.122 By
shifting the context in which P2P networks operate from one of
presumptive infringement to presumptive noninfringement, we
make it much more difficult for copyright holders to stop
unauthorized sharing. While copyright holders are nominally
offered a choice, the most profitable option should be
participation in the compulsory licensing regime.
So why not just say what we are doing? Why not throw
open the gates and refuse to allow copyright holders to opt out?
First, allowing this nominal choice keeps us from violating
treaty obligations. Second, the appearance of a choice will
make the implementation of compulsory licensing more
politically feasible. Finally, this system allows the owners of
underlying copyrights in the work the opportunity to privately
bargain and agree on how to split up the money they receive.
This system of private ordering will set prices more accurately
than a government-mandated system of splitting up proceeds
among copyright owners.
4. Collection
A levy will be placed on products used to consume digital
v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
121. See Sony Corp v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(establishing that devices “suitable for substantial noninfringing use” do not
give rise to contributory copyright infringement liability).
122. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d
1154 (9th Cir. 2004), (holding that vendors of P2P software are not
contributorily or vicariously liable for users’ acts of copyright infringement).
But cf. In Re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Posner, J.) (upholding grant of preliminary injunction to plaintiff copyright
holders against continued distribution of Aimster, a P2P application).
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media.123 Fisher and Netanel have performed good analyses of
the types of goods that should be levied and what levy amounts
would produce the necessary revenues.
5. Measurement
The sole measure of the popularity of a work will be the
number of peers making it available for download. This has a
number of advantages. First, it fairly accurately reflects
whether the user listens to the song or watches the movie; disk
space being scarce, unwanted media are likely to be deleted.
Because users will have no incentive to disable the sharing
function of their P2P software once file swapping is legal, the
musical tastes of the vast majority of P2P users will be
reflected. By refusing to share, all they accomplish is denying
compensation to their favorite musical artists; they do not pay
any less, but they lose the power to control where part of their
money goes. Second, it is by its nature public and verifiable.
P2P networks function by accurately returning a list of the
hosts on which a particular file can be found; this method
exploits that feature.124 In fact, a version of this popularity
measurement method is already being used by a private
company to generate data on the popularity of MP3 files on
behalf of major record companies.125 Third, it is easy to
implement in existing systems, since all P2P networks natively
include the required functionality.
Finally, it can be implemented while allowing the use of
123. Optionally, consumers and businesses could be able to receive a
refund of the levy amount from the manufacturer by submitting a form
including proof of purchase and a statement, under penalty of perjury, that
the products will not be used to consume digital media covered by the
compulsory license scheme. The problem with this is that everyone is likely to
always claim that their products will not be used to consume digital media,
since it’s effectively impossible to check.
124. In the face of recent RIAA lawsuits, some P2P software packages have
begun to allow users to keep the lists of files shared private, responding only
to requests for specific files and not to requests for lists of entire collections.
This would not prove a problem for two reasons. First, the incentive for such
behavior would go away once the regime was implemented, since the RIAA
lawsuits would end. Second, the absence of these users from the sample will
not affect its accuracy significantly. If sharers choose to hide their lists, they
just lose their opportunity to make sure their favorite artists are appropriately
compensated.
125. See Jeff Howe, BigChampagne Is Watching You, WIRED 11:10,
available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.10/fileshare.html (October
2003) (last visited October 17, 2004) (describing P2P metrics company
BigChampagne and its relationship with major record labels).
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open-source software and without violating e2e. When the
copyright holder registers the work, she includes a deposit copy
of the work in digital form. The copyright office, using a
publicly-available,
royalty-free
audio
fingerprinting
algorithm,126 generates and posts the audio fingerprint of the
The measurement authority runs a number of
song.127
computers that crawl P2P networks, querying randomlyselected hosts for a list of the audio fingerprints of the files
they’re sharing. The hosts cannot send audio fingerprints of
files they are not in fact sharing, since the measurement
servers periodically download randomly-selected files as a spotcheck mechanism, and it is impossible to derive a
corresponding audio file from an audio fingerprint. There will
be criminal penalties for causing a host to falsify its reports;
violators will be caught through these spot-checks.
If the audio fingerprint of a downloadable file matches that
one file with the copyright office, the work will be credited with
one “availability.” If it does not match, no credit will be
given.128 This will encourage copyright holders to make
‘official’ versions of their works widely available on P2P
networks, to make it even more likely that each host sharing
the file results in an “availability.” P2P servers run by
copyright holders or their affiliates will be required to identify
themselves to the measurement crawler; failure to do so will
result in stiff penalties, including contributory and vicarious
liability.129
This way, the measurement authority receives an accurate
picture of the popularity of each file without placing
measurement in the network itself, without trusting each
individual host to report information that is not immediately
verifiable, and without supplanting existing P2P protocols.
6. Distribution
The market has already decided the relative value of works
by their popularity. The regulatory system should not alter
126. Obviously,
no
such
publicly-available,
royalty-free
audio
fingerprinting algorithm has yet been released, but one could be developed or
licensed during the implementation of the system.
127. See supra note 114.
128. There will be a temptation to use data about files that do not
correspond to registered works as fodder for infringement investigations.
129. The only other way to game the system would be to write a virus or
worm that caused infected machines to share the file in question. If done with
knowledge of the registrant, the registrant would be vicariously liable.
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these results. However, if registrants were simply paid a set
amount per availability, people with large music collections
would have more influence on the distribution of funds than
people with small music collections. Because there are only so
many hours in a day, we can assume that a person with a small
music collection listens to each song more often than a person
with a large music collection.130 For this reason, the ability of
each host to influence the distribution of the pool should be the
same regardless of the number of files it makes available.131
Stated differently, each host gets the same number of “votes,”
and those votes are divided up equally among all works in that
host’s collection.132
For work x, the overall share of the pool (Sx) is:

Ax
F
Sx = x
A1...n
F1...n
where n is the total number of works in the sample, A
measures the number of hosts on which the work is available, F
measures the total number of works shared by the hosts
sharing the work, and S is the percentage of the total pool to be
distributed to the registrant of x. To determine the amount
paid to each registrant, we simply multiply by the total pool of
money to be distributed, so

130. This assumption is not perfect; music fans with large collections seem
likely to spend more hours per day listening to music than people for whom
the lower relative importance of music is reflected by their small music
collections.
131. This makes the system slightly easier to game, since it rewards a
cheater who sets up a farm of hosts which each share only one song. However,
a registrant who did so would be criminally liable.
132. This is, in some ways, a modification of the “voting” system proposed
in the Blur/Banff Proposal. See Jamie Love, Artists Want to be Paid: The
Blur/Banff
Proposal,
at
http://www.nsu.newschool.edu/blur/blur02/user_love.html (Mar. 25, 2003) (last
visited October 17, 2004). However, my proposal does not require any action
on the part of the user and does not allow the expression of extra-artistic
preferences.
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Ax
F
Px = T × x
A1...n
F1...n
where T is the total pool of money to be distributed and P
is the payment to the registrant of x.
So, for example, imagine three users, Arthur, Boris, and
Carrie. A has 3 songs in his collection. B has 2 songs in his
collection. C has 5 songs in her collection. A and C are both
sharing “Baby One More Time.” B is sharing “Saint Simon” by
The Shins. A, B, and C are all sharing “Say Yes” by Elliott
Smith. A is sharing “Come Home, Baby Julie” by The
American Analog Set. C is sharing “The District Sleeps
Tonight” by The Postal Service, “Fox in the Snow” by Belle and
Sebastian, and “Allison” by Elvis Costello. Thus, Britney
receives 12.8% of the pool, The Shins receive 25.6%, Elliott
Smith receives 15.4%, The American Analog Set receives
15.4%, and The Postal Service, Belle and Sebastian, and Elvis
Costello each receive 10.3%.133
Thus, this method of measurement does not allow any one
user or class of users to have a disproportionate effect on the
distribution of funds, can be calculated using publicly available
data, and distributes funds based entirely on the popularity of
the work.
B. OBJECTIONS TO THIS SYSTEM
1. Why just music?
My proposal assumes that only musical works and sound
recordings will be included in the compulsory licensing scheme.
This choice is necessary for both technological and political
reasons. First, “audio fingerprinting” technology is not yet
practical for video files. Second, the pricing structure of music
uniquely lends itself to compulsory licensing.
Third, a
compulsory license scheme for music can be implemented
without modifying international treaties to which the United
133. Ax/Fx for each of the works is 0.25, 0.5, 0.3, 0.3, 0.2, 0.2, and 0.2,
respectively. The sum of A1…n/F1…n, then, is 1.95. The percentage of the pool
for each work is found by dividing its Ax/Fx value by 1.95.
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States is a party; this is not true for other types of works.
Finally, for political reasons, the amount of money paid to
pornographers should be minimized; excluding video files
fulfills this goal almost completely.
First, audio fingerprinting does not work on video files,
making measurement difficult. Audio fingerprinting is a
computationally intensive process. It works by breaking down
the audio stream into a number of elements (such as harmonic
structure, tone, and so on), and then creating a signature that
uniquely represents those elements. It is likely that an
analogous technology for video files could be developed, but it
would likely be too computationally intensive for home
computers to perform within an acceptable time frame. As
home computers become more powerful, this problem is likely
to go away.
Distribution of funds collected for the noncommercial use
of video files would be more difficult than distribution of funds
collected for use of audio files because of differences in the
structure of the music and movie industries. Nearly all audio
consumed by the public is available on CDs. While there is
some variation among genres, most CDs cost between ten and
twenty dollars and contain between ten and twenty tracks. For
this reason, it is fair to implement a compensation scheme that
is uniform across musical works and genres. Video presents
more problems. There is a big difference both in the cost of
producing and the cost of purchasing, say, a funny sixty-second
animated short and a full-length action movie. While we could,
as Fisher suggests, simply pay different rates based on the
length and genre of the work, this adds a significant amount of
political complexity to an already politically complex system.
Third, a compulsory license scheme for music can be
implemented without modifying international treaties to which
the United States is a party; this is not true for other types of
works. The Berne Convention allows for the compulsory
licensing of musical works, and does not require protection for
sound recordings.134 Cinematographic works are protected,
and are subject to no such exception.135
Finally, we come to the problem of pornography. Simply
put, any legislative proposal that leads the U.S. Government to
issue large checks to pornographers is doomed. A considerable
134. See Berne Convention, supra note 102, at art. 13 § 1 and 11bis
(allowing compulsory license schemes for musical works).
135. See id. at art. 14bis (granting protection to cinematographic works).
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amount of the video files currently shared on P2P networks
That means that, under any
contain pornography.136
popularity-based system of measurement and distribution,
makers of pornographic videos would receive large sums, since
pornography is popular. Given the anti-pornography stance of
many powerful politicians, major political hurdles exist. One
can only imagine the indignation some would show at the
prospect of their money going, even indirectly, to fund
pornography. There is no reason to believe that the incidence
of pornography among P2P-traded video files will go down
dramatically in the future.
Why can’t we simply exclude pornography? It would be
easy enough to make it a requirement of registration that the
work is “not pornographic in nature.” However, problems
remain. First, determining what constitutes “pornography” is a
difficult task, and the margin for error is small. We could use a
“harmful to minors” standard, but that would eliminate many
R-rated movies. We could use an “obscenity” standard, but that
would allow all mainstream pornography to be compensated. I
suspect that there exists a non-empty set of video content that
Senator Orrin Hatch would define as “pornographic” and the
average consumer would define as “non-pornographic,” so the
political problem seems intractable.
2. Let the Music Industry Do the Distribution
The music industry has long-established methods for
distributing large pools of revenue fairly among creators and
copyright holders. There is no reason that a private authority
or set of authorities could not administer portions of this
regime. ASCAP, BMI, and SoundExchange may, among them,
be able to better distribute revenues to copyright holders than
the Copyright Office. A company like BigChampagne may be
better equipped to measure the popularity of files on P2P
networks than a government agency, and more prepared to
keep up with changes in file sharing software. This article
proposes only methods measurement and distribution; it
matters little who does the actual measuring and distributing.
136. See generally U.S. House of Representatives Special Investigations
Division, Children’s Access to Pornography Through Internet File-Sharing
Programs,
at
http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/2004081715392898690.pdf (July 27, 2001) (last visited October 17, 2004) (discussing the
availability of pornography to children over the Internet).
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The only part that the government really must do, for obvious
reasons, is the taxation.
CONCLUSION
An alternative compensation system based on taxation and
compulsory licensing will retain the efficiencies of a market
while eliminating the negative effect of property rights on
semiotic democracy. Further, implementing such a system will
compensate copyright holders who currently receive no
remuneration for noncommercial P2P sharing of their works.
No alternative compensation system will mollify all
stakeholders, but by making policy choices that are
technologically feasible, economically sound, and in accordance
with international treaties, such a system will improve
consumers’ access to culture and creators’ incentives to create.

